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Abstract 
 
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of governance on economic growth 
using a group of 188 countries. Although our main focus is on the 21 Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) countries, our findings can be applied to the other countries as well. 
 
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is we are able 
to create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six 
governance measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method. The first principal component derived from 
the WGIs explains as large as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI measurements, 
which indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for evaluating government’s 
managerial ability and effectiveness. Following the creation of CGI, the second contribution 
is we are able to quantify the marginal contribution of improvement in governance to 
economic performance using PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data. We find that the 
per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule of 
70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement in CGI would 
double the country’s per capita GDP in seven years. Nonetheless, the effect of improvement 
of governance can not account for the higher than expected per capita GDP in most of the 
oil rich MENA countries. In other words, the majority of the MENA countries have 
achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does not depend on sound governance.   
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I. Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that improving the business climate is a major factor for attracting both 
national and international investors to a country, which would ultimately be reflected in 
increasing economic growth. Investors will drive away from a politically unstable, 
bureaucratic, highly corrupted economy, and where the government is not delivering its 
services transparently and efficiently. A government that is socially accountable in delivering 
services and responsive to the needs of its citizens will ultimately create a democratic 
environment leading to inclusive growth and human development. 
The slow growth performances in many developing countries, especially Middle East 
and North African (MENA) countries, have been disappointing over the last decade. Since 
the second half of the 1980’s, growth and development studies have started to shed the light 
on the importance of improving institutions of governance on economic growth. The 
studies of Owens (1987) and Sen (1999) show that economic and political stability has a 
statistical significant impact on economic growth and development.  
Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of improved quality 
of governance on economic growth. The study of Knack and Keefer (1997) shows that both 
property rights and contract enforcement have positive impact on economic growth. 
Similarly, Campos and Nugent (1999) prove a statistically significant positive impact of 
governance on economic development. The work of Kaufmann, et al. (1999a and 1999b) 
reaches the same conclusion about the importance of governance to economic development. 
Similar findings are reached in the work of Knack and Keefer (1995) and Mauro (1995).  
Many of the research work of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United 
Nations, and the World Bank shows that good governance leads to economic growth. For 
instance, Kaufman and Kraay (2002) evaluate the World Governance Indicators over the 
period 1996 to 2002 and find a positive relationship between per capita income and quality 
of governance.  
One of the leading studies in the literature on institution is the paper by Acemoglu, 
et al. (2000) which shows that differences in economic performance among different nations 
can be attributed to the difference in institutions.  The paper shows that different 
colonization strategies have led to different types of institutions that remained until today. 
Colonies with low mortality rates had higher European settlements and accordingly stronger 
institutions were built which ultimately explains differences between countries in terms of 
current performance. Furthermore, the work of Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) concludes that 
differences between countries in terms of income and economic development are explained 
by differences in institutions. Within the same lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) show 
that differences in economic prosperity among nations can be explained by differences in 
political institutions. Their paper provides policy recommendations that reforming 
institutions would help in poverty alleviation. Additionally, the work of Chauvet and Collier 
(2004) finds that developing countries with poor quality of governance will lead to less 
 4
economic growth. And within the same lines, the cross sectional of study by Acemoglu and 
Robinson (2012) compares adjacent cities along the United States-Mexico border. They 
reach the conclusion that political and economic institutions underlie economic success and 
the degree of incentive structures and the state-market relationship is the determinant factor 
of cities’ growth performance.  
Given the previous background, the research on the link between governance and 
economic growth for the MENA region is relatively very thin. The World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicator project shows that the MENA region always ranks below the average 
of the sample. This World Bank project seeks to measure the quality of governance in a 
particular nation using six metrics: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These metrics 
are measured both by a Governance Score that ranges from -2.5 to +2.5, and a Percentile 
Rank relative to nations worldwide. 
The study of Leenders and Sfakianakis (2002) shows that the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and Libya 
is below the global median in terms of levels of public sector corruption. Similarly, the 
World (2003) study shows that the MENA countries perform lower than countries with 
similar incomes and characteristics. In addition, Chêne (2008) shows that based on the 
World Bank Governance Indicators, MENA countries perform above average in political 
stability, rule of law, and quality of administration, however, it performs below average for 
the transparency, voice accountability, and control of corruption.  
Within the same lines, Han, X., Khan, H., and Zhuang, J. (2014) analyzes the 
governance gap and its effect on economic growth. Among many other results, the study 
shows that “Middle East and North African countries with a surplus in political stability, government 
effectiveness, and corruption control are observed to grow faster than those with a deficit in these indicators by 
as much as 2.5 percentage points annually.” The study implies that governance matters to 
economic growth in the MENA region. 
Furthermore, Mehanna, Yazbeck, and Sarieddine (2010) study the relationship 
between governance and economic development in 23 MENA countries over the period 
1996-2005. Their study compares different challenges facing the region including education, 
fixed investment, presence of religious fractionalization, and governance. The study shows 
that improving governance is the main challenge facing the MENA countries. The study 
shows that voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and control of corruption 
exert the strongest economic impact on economic development. 
Additionally, Emara, N. and Jhonsa (2014) shows that despite the low performance 
of most of MENA countries on almost all the six measures of World Bank Governance 
Indicators, their estimated levels per capita of income are relatively higher than the rest of 
the countries in the sample. This study concludes that most of these countries have achieved 
relatively high but fragile standard of living that is not based on sound governance.  
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According to the latest available World Governance Indicator data for the Voice and 
Accountability metric, show that 16 of the Middle East and North Africa region’s 21 largest 
countries by population were given a negative Governance Score, and ranked in the 38th 
percentile or lower. For the Political Stability metric, 15 out of 21 were given a negative 
score and ranked in the 36th percentile or lower. For the Government Effectiveness metric, 
12 out of 21 nations had negative scores, and 3 out of 21 ranked below the 25th percentile. 
For Regulatory Quality, 15 out of 21 had negative scores, and 6 out of 21 again ranked 
below the 25th percentile. For Rule of Law, 11 out of 21 had negative scores, and 4 out of 21 
ranked below the 25th percentile. And for Control of Corruption, negative scores were given 
to 13 out of 21 nations, with 4 out of 21 ranking below the 25th percentile. 
Despite the MENA governments’ effort to enhance the level of governance, the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators show no significant change across all indicators, 
namely rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and accountability 
and regulatory quality for the MENA region over the period between 2007 and 2014. Of 
course looking at the MENA governance indicators, one can tell that the performance 
between these countries has been non-uniform. Countries such as Bahrain, Cyprus, Israel, 
Oman, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates have performed relatively better than the rest of 
the MENA countries. And with no doubt, given the recent political instability in Syria, the 
data shows that Syria is the worst of the list of the MENA countries in terms of all 
governance indicators. The data shows that Yemen and Iraq are following Syria in terms of 
low levels of governance quality especially for the political stability index. 
The Open Budget Index of 20151, which reflects government’s social accountability, 
shows that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria have recorded the lowest 
levels with a score of “scant or none (0-20)”. Furthermore, freedom of the citizens to 
express their opinions in political matters and the freedom of the press has been highly 
restricted in countries such as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. As Pintak, L. (2011) wrote 
about the Arab’s media poor standard of delivering services to its citizens “A free media is 
not necessarily a credible media.” So it’s not only a matter of freedom but it is also a matter 
of credibility.   
In general, the extent to which citizens of the MENA region have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society have been generally very week. The rule of law index is relatively 
the worst for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with an average of -1.29. Furthermore, what makes 
matters worse is for a country such as Egypt with a relatively strong legal framework (score -
0.60) it’s the problem lies in the implementation of such legislations.  This means that the 
                                                 
1 The Open Budget Initiative monitors the availability of seven key budget documents: Pre-Budget Statement, 
Executive’s Budget Proposal, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Reports, Mid-Year Review, Year-
End Report, and Audit Report. The index also records the presence of Citizens’ Budgets. 
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problem of governance is not only about its existence but also more importantly about the 
mechanism through which it can be implemented to positively affect the society.  
Additionally, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen 
suffer from relatively high levels of corruption with an average index of -1.02. Some of these 
countries have taken steps to fight corruption but still more efforts need to be done. For 
instance, Egypt has signed many international projects to fight corruption such as the 
MENA-OECD Task Force on Anti-Bribery, OECD Good Governance for Development in 
Arab Countries Initiative, the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network (ACINET), and 
the UNDP-POGAR project to support the Ministry of Investment in the fight against 
corruption (OECD, 2009). However, no significant change has happened and a lot still 
needs to be done from the side of the government such as developing a nationwide anti-
corruption strategy. 
Against the above background this study seeks to provide a comprehensive index of 
governance and estimate its impact on economic growth. Specifically, this study will attempt 
to answer the following questions: how does economic growth change as the comprehensive 
index of governance changes? Which component of governance is more important in 
explaining variations of economic growth among different countries? How these results are 
interpreted for the MENA region?  
This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the regression model and the 
methodology of the principal component analysis. Section 3 discusses the data set used. 
Section 4 analyzes the estimation results. Section 5 concludes this study. Section 6 includes 
the references. Finally, the appendix appears at this study.  
 
 
II. Empirical Specification 
 
(i) Regression Model  
 
Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), our regression model is presented below: 
 
pgdpi =  + *govi + ei  (1) 
 
Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is the governance index, e represents 
all the other factors not included in this parsimonious equation, and finally the subscripts i 
represents the country. The estimate of  will provide information on the marginal 
contribution of improving governance to the per capita gdp growth in the long run. 
 
We present the construction of composite governance index (CGI) using the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method in this section. Statisticians and data scientists 
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have long adopted this data reduction PCA method in their work. However, it’s not popular 
in economists’ empirical tool bag yet.  
 
 
(ii) Principal Components Analysis 
 
Given a data matrix X with p variables and n observations, we can write it as the following: 
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; where i = 1…n, j = 1…p.  (2) 
 
Geometrically, the goal of the PCA is to project the data matrix X from p 
dimensions to a smaller dimension k, where k << p, meanwhile keeping as much 
information (i.e., variance maximization) as possible in this dimension-reduced data matrix 
with the size n by k2. Specifically, the PCA method replaces a large number of correlated 
variables (X1, … , Xp) with a smaller number of uncorrelated variables (Principal 
Components; PC1, … , PCk).  
 
Mathematically, the first principal component is a linear combination of X1 to Xp 
observed variables that accounts for the largest variance among them: 
 
PC1 = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + apXp  (3) 
 
In equation (3) the vector of coefficient aj (j = 1…p) is termed loading vector and is 
normalized to avoid inflating the variance of PC1. By the same token, the second principal 
component (PC2) is another linear combination of X variables that accounts for the largest 
variance among them, however, with a constraint; PC2 is required to be orthogonal to PC1. 
Theoretically, we are able to track as many principal components as the number of variables 
(p of them) in the data matrix X. But in practice, we search for a much smaller number of 
principal components (PCs) that is able to capture as much as inforamtion from the original 
set of X variables. We present the algorithm for deriving PCs in the following section. 
 
(ii) Algorithm to derive PCs 
 
The algorithm to uncover PCs is based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) method 
(I.T. Jolliffe, 2002). While there is no specific rule to select the number of PCs, we use four 
criteria to determine the appropriate number of PCs; they are Kaiser-Harris’s stopping rule 
                                                 
2 Two excellent references that cover Principal Components Analysis method are “An Introduction to 
Statistical Learning/ with Applications in R” & “R in Action”. 
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(criteria), Cattell’s Scree test, Parallel analysis and Percent of cumulative variance (see J. 
Brown, an internet source on this topic). 
 
First, capital letter W is used to denote the variance-covariance matrix. Where W is 
related to data matrix X in the following form; W = 
1n
XX T
 , a p*p matrix and the superscript 
“T” is the transpose operator. Since W is a symmetric matrix it can be diagonalized as 
follows: 
 
W = VVT  (4) 
 
In equation (4), V is a matrix of eigenvectors and  is diagonal matrix with the 
eigenvalues. The matrix V is essential in deriving PCs and it’s also termed Principal Axes. 
Apply the SVD method to X and we can obtain the following: 
 
X = UVT  (5) 
 
As mentioned earlier, X is the data matrix with dimension n by p. U and V are both 
orthogonal squared matrix with dimension n and p, respectively.  is diagonal with diagonal 
entries that represent singular values. 
 
There is a relationship between equation (4) and (5), that is: 
 
W = 
1n
XX T
  = 1n
VUVU TTT

 )()(  = 
1n
VV T2

  (6) 
 
 
Comparing equation (4) to (6), it can be seen that the square of singular values (from 
) is actually the eigenvalues derived from the diagonalization of W (or XTX).  
 
Denote the eigenvalues j (j = 1…p). The size of each  to the sum of all s 
accounts for the proportion of variances in the original data matrix X that can be captured 
by the corresponding principal component. If we rearrange  in a descending order from 1 
to p, 1 and the corresponding eigenvector (or first principal component PC1) accounts for 
the largest proportion of variances in X. In practice, correlation of matrix X is applied before 
deriving PCs to avoid scaling problem. To this end, the principal components are derived by 
post-multiplying data matrix X with the principal axes V. Alternatively, PCs can also be 
derived using the following equation:  
 
XV = UVTV = U  (7) 
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According to equation (7), principal components (PCs) can be obtained using either 
one of the following outcome: 
 
PCs  XV  U  (8) 
 
III. Data 
The cross-sectional data set is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators and it covers 188 countries for the year 2009 and 2013, with special focus on 21 
MENA countries3. The reason to choose these two specific years for this study is to make a 
comparison about the governance change before and after the Arab Spring that have started 
in Tunisia in 2010. For governance indicators, the Worldwide Governance Indicators is used 
which have been published annually since 1998. The data of the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators is compiled at the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobato ́n (1999) 
and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). These indicators are based on some 30 opinion 
and perception-based surveys of various governance measures from investment consulting 
firms, non-government organizations, think tanks, governments, and multilateral agencies; 
and classified into six dimensions including government effectiveness, political stability, 
control of corruption and regulatory quality, voice and accountability, and rule of law4. Data 
on GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing power parity terms is sourced from the World 
Development Indicators. 
 
IV. Empirical Outcomes & Findings 
 
We first report the loadings of the six principal components and the corresponding 
eigenvalues in Table 1. How many principal components are needed to capture the most 
variances in X? Kaiser–Harris criterion suggests retaining components with eigenvalues that 
are greater than one. In the Cattell Scree test, the eigenvalues s are plotted against their 
component numbers p. If a big bend is revealed, the components above this bend will be 
kept. In Figure 1, the blue line flattens out after the second component which is where the 
bend appears. In the Parallel analysis, a series of s are obtained based on simulation. If the 
eigenvalues obtained from X are greater than the average of simulated s, the corresponding 
principal components are selected. The cross symbols “x” in Figure 1 represent all the six 
eigenvalues. The three criteria presented in Figure 1 all indicate the first principal component 
should be selected; the cross symbol at the top left corner. While we do not show the 
                                                 
3 There are 22 MENA countries that include Algeria (DZA), Bahrain (BHR), Cyprus (CYP), Djibouti (DJI), 
Egypt (EGY), Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon (LBN), Libya 
(LBY), Morocco (MAR), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Syria (SYR), Tunisia (TUN), 
Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (ARE), West Bank and Gaza (WBG), and Yemen (YEM). Syria is 
excluded in this study due to missing WGI data. 
4 The detailed definition of each indicator is provided in the appendix. 
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percent of cumulative variance graphically, a quick computation using the eigenvalues 
presented at the bottom of Table 1, we can find that the first PC explains about 81%5 of 
variances from the original data set, X. 
 
We transform the original WGIs to a single composite governance index using the 
following computational process: 
 
PC1 = X*L1  (9) 
 
 
CGI = 
)max( 1
1
PC
PC *100  (10) 
 
In equation (9), it shows that the first principal component is obtained by multiplying 
both data matrix X and the first loading L1 (the first column in red ink in Table 1). The 
Composite Governance Index (CGI) is the PC1 rescaled by dividing the largest element in 
the PC1. The histogram of the CGI is reported in Figure 2. It’s a bit skewed to the right. The 
median index is about -9.7. Our CGI indicates that Finland (FIN) has the best governance 
index that equals 100 and Afghanistan (AFG) has the lowest index that equals -88.85 among 
these 188 countries in our data. Based on the quartiles of the CGI, we also report the 
ranking of governance of these 21 MENA countries in Table 2. Among these MENA 
countries, Cyprus has the best governance ranking and Iraq has the lowest one.  
 
Using equation (1), we run a regression of the log of per capita GDP on the CGI and 
report the outcome in Table 3.1; the corresponding graphical outcome is presented in Figure 
3.1. In Table 3.1, due to small p-values, both the t test and F test support the significance of 
slope estimate and validity of the model. The slope estimate indicates that per capita GDP is 
going to grow by about 2% (0.0199) if the CGI increases by one unit. The multiple or 
adjusted R2 says that 53% of variation in log of per capita GDP can be explained by CGI.  
 
We also conduct another regression that is only based on these 21 MENA countries 
and report the outcome in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. It can be seen that the estimated slope is 
0.01804 that is a bit lower than the estimated slope of 0.0199 from the whole sample of 188 
countries. While the estimated slopes are similar, we do notice that the adjusted R2 drops 
significantly to 35.9%. 
 
                                                 
5 
045500493014140339405509087354
87354
......
.
  = 0.8122 or 81.22% 
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To this end, we make a comparison of the CGI and log of per capita GDP in both 
year 2009 and 2013 and summarize our findings in Table 4. The CGI in 2013 is obtained 
using the same loading we derived in 2009. While we feel disappointed that the improvement 
in CGI doesn’t fully coincide with the economic growth in the MENA countries, however, 
the low adjusted R2 we found earlier may indicate that there are more factors that are 
involved in these countries’ economic growth in addition to the soundness of governance. 
For example, Fig. 3.1 shows that the MENA countries that are way above the regression line 
are mostly oil rich countries. 
 
The results of Table 4 reveal interesting points. Over the period 2009 to 2013, only 
five of the countries in the MENA countries, namely United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Iraq, 
Israel, and West Bank and Gaza, have experienced an improvement in CGI that was 
accompanied by an enhancement in economic growth. Additionally, over the same period 
only one country in the sample, namely Iran, has experience an improvement in its CGI with 
no change in economic growth. Furthermore, only four countries namely Cyprus, Kuwait, 
Libya, Oman, and Yemen have experienced deterioration in their CGI that was also 
accompanied with lower economic growth over the same period. Finally, or more 
importantly, over the same period about fifty percent of the MENA countries, namely 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
Turkey have experienced deterioration in the CGI that was accompanied by an increase in 
economic growth. 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is we are able to create 
a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six governance 
measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the Principal 
Components Analysis (PCA). The first principal component derived from the WGIs 
explains as large as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI measurements, which 
indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for evaluating government’s managerial 
ability and effectiveness. The second contribution is we are able to quantify the marginal 
contribution of improvement in governance on economic performance using PPP adjusted 
constant per capita GDP data. We find that the per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if 
the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule of 70, the marginal estimate further indicates a 
mere five-unit improvement in CGI would double a country’s per capita GDP in seven years.  
 
Our results suggest that nine countries of the MENA region have shown a positive 
correlation between governance and economic growth which includes those countries that 
have experience deterioration accompanied by deterioration and those countries that have 
experienced an enhancement accompanied by an enhancement in governance index and in 
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economic growth, respectively. The relatively low R2 of 35.9% confirms these results. More 
specifically, the CGI explains only 35.9% of the variations in economic growth in the 
MENA region. Our results go in line with the findings of Emara and Jhonsa (2014) that the 
majority of the MENA countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does 
not depend on sound governance.  Our next step in this research is to include more control 
variables in the MENA regression model and we hope that, by doing this, we can have a 
better qualitative prediction outcome on the link between governance and growth in this 
region. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A: Governance Indicators and Definitions 
1- Voice and 
accountability 
Measured by the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, 
association, and the press.  
2- Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Measured by the likelihood that a government will be destabilized by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. 
3- Government 
effectiveness 
Measured by the quality of public services, the capacity of civil services 
and their independence from political pressure, and the quality of policy 
formulation.  
4- Regulatory quality Measured by the ability of a government to provide sound policies and 
regulations that enable and promote private sector development. 
5- Rule of law Measured by the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, including the quality of property rights, the police and 
the courts, and the risk of crime. 
6- Control of 
corruption 
Measured by the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as elite 
“capture” of the state.  
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Figure 2 The Distribution of Composite Governance Index 
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Figure 3.1 Linear Regression for All 188 Countries 
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Figure 3.2 Linear Regression for 21 MENA Countries 
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Table 1 Loadings of Principal Components 
 
WGI\Loadings of PCs L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
Control of Corruption (corr) 0.4303 -0.062 0.2557 -0.6295 0.5808 -0.1095
Government Effectiveness (ef) 0.431 -0.2729 0.2576 0.0263 -0.2887 0.7677 
Political Stability (ps) 0.3377 0.8773 0.1642 0.2728 0.0836 0.0892 
Regulatory Quality (rq) 0.415 -0.3868 0.0367 0.6964 0.337 -0.2799
Rule of Law (rl) 0.4424 -0.02 0.1273 -0.1736 -0.6771 -0.5469
Voice & Accountability (va) 0.3835 0.0454 -0.9076 -0.1167 0.0155 0.1152 
Eigenvalues () 4.8735 0.5509 0.3394 0.1414 0.0493 0.0455 
 
 
Table 2 Ranking According to the Quartiles 
Country CGI Rank Country CGI Rank 
ARE 28.10  2 KWT 13.56 2  
BHR 12.67  2 LBN -30.70  3 
CYP 58.25  1 LBY -45.35  4 
DJI -26.30  3 MAR -13.30  3 
DZA -41.87  4 OMN 16.69  2 
EGY -19.85  3 QAT 43.52  1 
IRN -58.69  4 SAU -13.49  3 
IRQ -71.26  4 TUN -3.55  2 
ISR 30.73  2 TUR 0.94  2 
JOR 3.08  2 WBG -34.46  4 
      YEM -59.40  4 
Rank = 1 if CGI > 35.4, Rank = 2 if -9.7 < CGI  35.4, Rank = 3 if -34.1 < CGI  -9.7, 
Rank = 4 if CGI  -34.1
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Table 3.1 Linear Regression for All 188 Countries 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)   9.0723     0.0620   146.2    <2e-16 *** 
CGI      0.0199     0.0014     14.5   <2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.851 on 186 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.53 
Adjusted R-squared:  0.527  
F-statistic: 210 on 1 and 186 DF, p-value: <2e-16 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2 Linear Regression for 21 MENA Countries 
Coefficients: 
             Estimate  Std. Error  t value  Pr(>|t|)     
(Intercept)   9.98598     0.18561    53.80    <2e-16 *** 
CGI     0.01804     0.00517     3.49    0.0024 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
Residual standard error: 0.817 on 19 degrees of freedom 
Multiple R-squared:  0.391     
Adjusted R-squared:  0.359  
F-statistic: 12.2 on 1 and 19 DF, p-value: 0.00244 
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Table 4 
Country CGI/09 CGI/13 Improve 
Actual 
logY/09 
Actual 
logY/13 Growth
ARE 28.10 32.26 4.16 11.02 11.02 YES 
BHR 12.67 -2.24 -14.91 10.61 10.64 YES 
CYP 58.25 51.03 -7.22 10.44 10.31 NO 
DJI -26.30 -36.58 -10.27 7.86 7.98 YES 
DZA -41.87 -40.31 1.56 9.44 9.49 YES 
EGY -19.85 -43.65 -23.80 9.19 9.22 YES 
IRN -58.69 -55.06 3.63 9.69 9.66 NO 
IRQ -71.26 -67.17 4.09 9.40 9.63 YES 
ISR 30.73 33.98 3.26 10.26 10.34 YES 
JOR 3.09 -6.42 -9.50 9.33 9.34 YES 
KWT 13.56 -3.35 -16.91 11.29 11.22 NO 
LBN -30.70 -34.57 -3.87 9.66 9.71 YES 
LBY -45.35 -75.04 -29.69 10.24 9.88 NO 
MAR -13.30 -16.00 -2.69 8.74 8.84 YES 
OMN 16.69 6.84 -9.84 10.77 10.57 NO 
QAT 43.52 37.57 -5.95 11.70 11.82 YES 
SAU -13.49 -13.64 -0.14 10.68 10.80 YES 
TUN -3.55 -14.09 -10.54 9.23 9.28 YES 
TUR 0.94 -1.84 -2.78 9.65 9.83 YES 
WBG -34.46 -33.21 1.25 8.34 8.41 YES 
YEM -59.40 -64.84 -5.45 8.38 8.21 NO 
CGI: composite governance index, Improve = CGI/14 – CGI/13 
logY = natural log of per capita GDP, Growth: whether logY/13 > logY/09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
